Products Liability: The Privity Requirement in Wisconsin by Balistreri, Peter S.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 2 Fall 1963 Article 4
Products Liability: The Privity Requirement in
Wisconsin
Peter S. Balistreri
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Peter S. Balistreri, Products Liability: The Privity Requirement in Wisconsin, 47 Marq. L. Rev. 209 (1963).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol47/iss2/4
COMMENTS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE PRIVITY
REQUIREMENT IN WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Prompted by the dicta enunciated in the recent Wisconsin case of
Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co.,1 plus the recent adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code in Wisconsin, 2 this comment will attempt to point out
the practical effect of abrogating or modifying the privity requirement
in products liability cases. Although there is no paucity of law review
articles in this area, there appears to be little analysis peculiar to Wis-
consin law.
A. Negligence and Warranty
Negligence and warranty are descendants of the old common law
action, trespass on the case.3 The former continued to follow the path
of tort law while the latter branched onto the path of contract. In many
respects both actions reveal their common heredity in that what affects
one, in time, generally affects the other. Although most of the controversy
today concerns privity in warranty cases and the bulk of this comment
preponderates thereon, this author feels that a brief history of privity
in negligence, both nationally and in Wisconsin, will help the reader to
parallel the development of both areas.
B. Putting Wisconsin in Perspective
The classic case of Winterbottom v. Wright4 is credited with giving
birth to the rule that a manufacturer is not liable for negligence to a
remote vendee or other third person with whom he had no contractual
relations. This decision took hold in various jurisdictions across the
United States5 and was eventually applied in the early Wisconsin4 case
of Zieman v. The Kieckhefer Elevator MVfg. Co.' In that case, the de-
fendant manufacturer had installed a faulty elevator which resulted in
injury to the plaintiff. Because there was no privity between the two
the court denied plaintiff recovery.
The harsh doctrine of Winterbottom was ameliorated in the New
York case of Thomas v. Winchesters when the court engrafted the
"inherently dangerous instrumentality" exception. The seed of Thonms
blossomed into the famous rule enunciated by Justice Cardozo in Mac-
116 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W. 2d 823 (1963).
2 Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 158 (effective July 1, 1965).
3 PRossER, TORTS 493 (2d ed. 1955), citing Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888).
4 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
5 See Annots., 164 A.L.R. 569 (1946) and 74 A.L.R. 2d 1095 (1960).
6 For a more thorough discussion of Wisconsin cases in this area see Wickam,
Prodixcts Liability in Wisconsin, 29 MARQ. L. REv. 20 (1945).
90 Wis. 497, 63 N.W. 1021 (1895).
86 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
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Pherson v. Buick Motor Co." That case widened the interpretation to
"imminently dangerous instrumentality," so as to include anything
which might reasonably imperil life and limb when negligently made.
Following the trend of these cases was Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co.10
In that case the plaintiff was injured when an automobile driven by
defendant Johnson ran into her, due to ineffective brakes. Johnson had
purchased the car from the defendant-retailer, Fox Bros. The court re-
versed a judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint as to Fox Bros.
After stating the general rule of Winterbottom the court said:
To this [general rule] an exception has long been recognized
with reference to products which are inherently and normally
dangerous.. . .11
In the years following MacPherson the "imminently dangerous in-
strumentality" exception had been interpreted so broadly by so many
courts that the original rule of Wixterbottom has been virtually
eclipsed.' All doubts as to Wisconsin's position were finally laid
to rest in Smith v. Atco.13 That case involved a mink rancher whose
purchase of a solution in which to dip his nesting boxes resulted in the
death of many mink and a decrease in quality of those that survived.
An action was brought in negligence against both the manufacturer and
the supplier, neither of whom were in privity with the plaintiff. Justice
Currie speaking for a unanimous court declared:
We deem that the time has come for this court to flatly declare
that in a tort action for negligence against a manufacturer, or
supplier, whether or not privity exists is wholly immaterial. The
question of liability should be approached from the standpoint of
care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent person in the
shoes of the defendant.' 4
Thus, after a century, the body of law generated by Winterbottom v.
Wright has had its jurisprudential bones picked clean so that all that
remains (at least in Wisconsin) is a legal skeleton of another era.
III. IMPLIED WARRANTY-THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
A. Introduction
The scope of this comment is not broad enough to encompass all of
the fine distinctions between the various types and subclasses of war-
ranties.' 5 The discussion will presume the typical case: a breach of an
implied warranty by a manufacturer, resulting in damage to a user who
9 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
"I Id. at 383, 218 N.W. at 857.
12 See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 2d 1189 (1960).
"36 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W. 2d 697 (1959).
:14 Id. at 383, 94 N.W. 2d at 704.
15 See UNIFORM SALES ACT §§12-16 and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§2-312 to
2-318.
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is not in privity with the manufacturer, and the various means of
handling the privity requirement.
B. Wisconsin's Position
The dicta in the recent case of Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co.'6
makes Wisconsin's future position in this area one of pure speculation.
That case involved an infant who sustained an eye injury as a result of
being struck by a toy airplane launched by her five year old brother,
Butchie. The toy was purchased for Butchie by his grandmother from
the defendant, Walgreen Co. Butchie managed to get his hands on the
toy even though his father, thinking it too dangerous, prohibited him
from playing with it. The action was based on negligence and breach
of an implied warranty. Although the court disposed of the implied
warranty issue by finding that the toy was not an inherently dangerous
instrumentality as alleged in the complaint, it took the opportunity to
state some enlightening dicta:
When this court declared by footnote in Smith v. Atco. Co. that
Wisconsin requires privity in breach-of-implied-warranty cases,
it was merely stating the then present status of our law. This
does not mean that this court will adhere to this rule forever,
regardless of the persuasiveness of the arguments made, or au-
thorities cited, in favor of changing it. However, we do not deem
the instant case a proper one in which to give consideration to
this question.17
A brief, but forceful, dissent was written by Justice Hallows. He advo-
cated abrogating privity in implied warranty cases involving inherently
dangerous instrumentalities which he believed the toy to be.'
Thus, excluding the provision of section 2-318 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Wisconsin's position in products liability cases involving
breach of an implied warranty is clear: privity is absolutely required.
C. Putting Wisconsin in Perspective
As to the necessity of privity in breach of implied warranty cases, the
courts have taken one, or a combination of, five basic positions:
1. Absolute necessity of privity;
2. No privity needed in food cases;
3. No privity needed when product is inherently dangerous;
4. Uniform Commercial Code, sections 2-318 and 2-607(5);
and
5. No privity needed whatsoever, accomplished either by statute
or an artifice of legal fiction.
The first four plus the statutory means of the fifth meet the problem of
privity in a more straightforward manner than those jurisdictions em-
16 Note 1 supra.
7id. at 435, 114 N.W. 2d at 831. See also RESTATEMENT (SECoND), ToaRs §402-
(a) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
1s Id. at 436, 144 N.W. 2d at 831.
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ploying legal fiction. The subsequent analysis will proceed within these
five strata, citing style cases in each, a parallel Wisconsin case-if there
be one, the policy underlying each, and the consequences to the manu-
facturer.
1. Absolute Necessity of Privity
The policy of a strict privity requirement was part of the laissez faire
attitude adopted during the Industrial Revolution when the manufac-
turer-purchaser transaction at arm's length was the rule rather than the
exception. 19 With the advent of complex marketing structures, its
rationale as a legal principle in the vertical channel 20 of distribution
from manufacturer to consumer has to a large extent disappeared.
Wisconsin's strict adherence to the privity requirement is part of
a waning majority across the nation. An example of this doctrine is
found in Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc." The usual manufac-
turer-retailer-purchaser chain in that case concerned adulterated mink
food. A demurrer by the manufacturer to the purchaser's complaint was
sustained because privity was lacking. Another style case is that of
Kennedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner." In that case a defective apron
injured an employee of the A. 0. Smith Corp. The apron was purchased
from Kennedy who in turn had purchased from the manufacturer's
agent, Meissner. In reversing the trial court, the supreme court allowed
A. 0. Smith to intervene in an action by Kennedy against the manu-
facturer for breach of warranty, reasoning that otherwise Smith would
be barred from bringing a subsequent action for breach of warranty.
The court stated:
Smith cannot institute such an action [breach of warranty] in
its own right because of the lack of privity between it and the
defendants [manufacturer]. 23
The dicta of Strahlendorf seems to indicate that the citadel of a
strict privity requirement in Wisconsin is beginning to crumble. 24
2. No Pritvity Needed in Food Cases
It is in the area of injury due to human consumption of deleterious
food products that privity has been dealt its sharpest blow. Eighteen
states have abolished privity on one theory or another in such cases and
have imposed a strict liability standard.2 5 Other states have resorted to
various fictions, but the strict liability approach seems to most candidly
solve the problem. One of the typical cases in this area is that of Jacob
'9 Murphy, Medieval Theory and Products Liability, 3 B. C. L. REV. 29, 30(1961).
20 See illustration 1 in text infra.
21291 Wis. 584, 53 N.W. 2d 788 (1951).
225 Wis. 2d 100, 92 N.W. 2d 247 (1958).
2Id. at 109, 92 N.W. 2d at 252.
24 Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
25PRossER, TORTS 508-09 (2d ed. 1955).
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E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps.26 which held the manufacturer strictly
liable for marketing defective sausage although no negligence was
found. The theory was simply one of public policy. But the majority,
including Wisconsin, still clings to the privity requirement. The leading
case in Wisconsin is Prinsen v. Russos.27 The plaintiff suffered from
trichinosis after eating ham purchased by a third person in plaintiff's
party. Plaintiff sued in breach of implied warranty of fitness for use
and common law negligence. There being no finding of negligence and
no privity between the litigants, plaintiff was denied recovery.
The policy argument in this area is obvious: nowhere is a person
more subject to injury by a latent defect than in situations involving
food. Thus it is very likely that Wisconsin's first relaxation of the
privity requirement will be in this area.2 8 But because there are many
other products whose defects are equally undetectable and injurious as
food, logic seems to compel either a greater abrogation of privity or a
sounder premise to substantiate an exception in the food area alone.29
However, the fabric of the law has had the acid of illogic spilled on it
before.
In a vertical situation,30 privity is not as effective a shield to the
manufacturer as one might at first think. As a practical matter, the pur-
chaser will usually sue the retailer from whom he bought the product.
The retailer will then turn around and sue the manufacturer for breach
of warranty. Where the purchaser sues the manufacturer directly a
settlement out of court is generally less harmful than the adverse
publicity of a law suit, even though the manufacturer could use the
privity requirement as a technical defense.
3. No Privity Needed When the Product is Inherently Dangerous
Rapidly emerging as a landmark case in this area is Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.31 Plaintiff-wife was injured while driving an
automobile purchased by her husband from defendant-dealer. Breach of
an implied warranty of merchantability was found, and the requirement
of privity was dispensed with. The rule was stated by the court:
Thus, where the commodities sold are such that if defectively
manufactured they will be dangerous to life or limb, then so-
26 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942).
27 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).
28 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Notes of Decisions 161-62, citing Adams v.
Scheib, 75 Pa. Dauph. 158 (1961):
The developing case law is to the effect that in cases involving food
or other articles for human consumption a buyer's right of action for
breach of warranty is not restricted to his immediate seller, but where
the article in question is other than food, the buyer must show privity
of contract in order to maintain assumpsit against a remote vendor.
29 See discussion of Henningesen. v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.
2d 69 (1960) in text infra.
30 See illustration 1 in text infra.
31 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 29. See also 1 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, PRoDucrs LIABILITY 406-410, 418-423 (1961).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ciety's interests can only be protected by eliminating the require-
ment of privity between the maker and his dealer and the reason-
ably expected ultimate consumer.
3 2
The next question is just how broad the court's idea of the "reasonably
expected ultimate consumer" will be. The court seemingly adopted the
tort standard of forseeability when it stated:
... rigid concepts of privity [may be relaxed] when third per-
sons, who in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to a
warranty might be expected to use or consume the product sold,
are injured by its unwholesome or defective state.33 [Emphasis
added.]
Wisconsin might have joined the ranks of Henningsen had the ma-
jority in Strahlendorf found the toy an inherently dangerous instru-
mentality, but Justice Hallow's recruiting was to no avail. If the court
should impregnate Wisconsin's body of sales law with the seed of an
"inherently dangerous instrumentality" exception or its equivalent, there
will be one inevitable result: expansion. One need only look back as far
as MacPherson for a tailor-made analogy.
4. Uniform Commercial Code, Sections 2-318 and 2-607(5).
Section 2-318, Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express
or Implied.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such a person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.34
Section 2-607(5) . . . Notice of Claim or Litigation to Person
Answerable Over.
Where the buyer is sued for breach of warranty or other obliga-
tion for which his seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation.
If the notice states that the seller may come in and defend
and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any
action against him by his buyer by any determination of
fact common to the two litigations, then unless the seller
after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and
defend he is so bound.35
The discussion of the problems in this area can perhaps best be il-
lustrated by resorting to the "horizontal-vertical" dichotomy.36 Hori-
zontal privity concerns claims by persons other than the buyer against
33 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 29, at 81.
331d. at 100.
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318 (1962).
35 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-607 (5) (1962).
36 Neuman, The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection
Under Warranty Law, 49 KENT. L. J. 240, 260-68 (1960-61).
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the buyer's vendor. Vertical privity involves claims of a subvendee
against the manufacturer. Section 2-318 concerns the former, section
2-607(5) the latter.
Horizontal Privity Vertical Privity
Vendor-defendant Vendor-defendant
Vendee -> User-plaintiff Vendee
Subvendee-plaintiff
ILLUSTRATION No. 1
a. Horizontal privity
Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code is significant only
as to its impact on horizontal privity. One may wonder why the drafters
limited the scope of protection to only family, household, and guests
personally injured and not to other logically foreseeable victims such
as pedestrians injured in automobile cases,37 and also, why property
damage is not covered. It seems the drafters have compromised be-
tween a strict privity requirement on the one hand and a broader foresee-
ability test on the other by adopting the "family, household, and guest"
trio. Standing alone, the last sentence of this section can be misleading.
The comments state that the seller may disclaim any and all warranties
allowed under section 2-31631 and his buyer's remedies for breach may
37 Note that an earlier draft of §2-318 used the words "one whose relationshig
to him [the buyer] is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such per-
son may use, consume or be affected by the goods .. " UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE §2-318 (May, 1949 Draft). For a discussion advocating the
1949 Draft, see James, Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REv. 194 n. 10 (1955)38UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316: Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be con-
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject
to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Sec-
tion 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention mer-
chantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must
be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's atten-
tion to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is
no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has re-
fused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with re-
gard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course
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be limited by applying sections 2-718 and 2-719.11 The drafters state:
The purpose of this section is to give the buyer's family, house-
hold and guests the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer
received in the contract of sale. .... 40
So the protection afforded a member of the family or household, or a
guest is dependent on the original seller-purchaser transaction. Although
the ameliorating significance of this section on Wisconsin sales law can
be readily seen by applying it to our Prinsen v. Russos41 fact situation,
of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with
the provisions of this article on liquidation or limitation of damages
and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
39UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-718: Liquidation or Limitation of Damages;
Deposits.
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement
but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated
or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss,
and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an ade-
quate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is
void as a penalty.
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods because of the
buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any amount by
which the sum of his payments exceeds
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of terms liqui-
dating the seller's damages in accordance with subsection (1), or(b) in the absence of such terms, twenty per cent of the value of the
total performance for which the buyer is obligated under the con-
tract or $500, whichever is smaller.
(3) The buyer's right to restitution under subsection (2) is subject to offset
to the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this Article
other than subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer directly or
indirectly by reason of the contract.
(4) Where a seller has received payment in goods their reasonable value or
the proceeds of their resale shall be treated as payments for the purposes
of subsection (2) ; but if the seller has notice of the buyer's breach
before reselling goods in part performance, his resale is subject to the
conditions laid down in this Article on resale by an aggrieved seller
(Section 2-706).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-719: Contractual Modification or Limitation
of Remedy.
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and
of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in sub-
stitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment
of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods
or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie un-
conscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial
is not.
40 UNIFORM COM MERCIAL CODE §2-318, comment 2.
41194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).
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where a purchaser shares the goods with his guest who is subsequently
injured by the defective product (in that case infected ham), it appears
that there are still several large holes through which a seller may escape.
b. Vertical privity
Section 2-318 expressly refuses to abrogate or reform the vertical
requirement. As comment 3 states:
Beyond this [family, household, guest], the section is neutral and
is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law in
whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells,
extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
Section 2-607(5) also skirts any revision in the vertical requirement,
but does contribute some procedural relief to a sued buyer. The effect
of this section is to make determinations of fact in the first suit (sub-
vendee v. vendee) res judicata in the second suit (vendee v. vendor)
if the vendor does not come in and defend in the first suit after notice
by the vendee.42 Because of the Wisconsin impleader statute,43 this sec-
tion of the Code will have limited effect, but there are two important
differences. One, the Code provision allows the sued buyer to bring
in his seller in a summary fashion; whereas in an impleader situation
under the Wisconsin statute, it is generally within the discretion of the
court whether or not the third party seller need be brought in.44 Secondly,
section 2-607(5) appears to dispense with jurisdictional problems which
might have to be hurdled under the Wisconsin impleader statute.
45 It
seems, then, that in vertical privity cases the manufacturer is insulated
from ultimate liability only when the vendee (middleman retailer or
wholesaler) is judgment-proof. But, as a matter of fact, most manu-
facturers must stand behind their retailers or else lose valuable market-
ing outlets. And, as stated before, the expense of settlement is often
less damaging than the adverse publicity of a lawsuit.
5. No Privity Needed Whatsoever Due to Statute or Legal Fiction
a. Statutory abrogation of privity
In 1957, Georgia enacted the following statute:
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new
property either directly or through wholesale or retail deal-
ers, or any other person, shall warrant the following to
42 Neuman, supra note 36, at 265.
43 WIs. STAT. §260.19(3) (1961). A defendant, who if he be held liable in the
action, will thereby obtain a right of action against a person not a party
may apply for an order making such person a party defendant and the court
may so order.
44 Gordon, Third-Party I-npleader in Wisconsin, 35 MARQ. L. REv. 108, 111
(1951). But see, Kennedy-Ingalls v. Meissner, 5 Wis. 2d 100, 108-09, 92 N.W.
2d 247, 252 (1958), where the court stated:
. ..there is a limitation to such rule [that court's discretion governs]
and that it does not apply to a situation where parties seeking inter-
vention "have such intereest in the subject matter of the controversy as
require them to be parties for their protection.
-5 Wis. STAT. §§262.04, .05, .08 (1961).
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the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise cau-
tion when purchasing to detect defects, and provided
there is no express covenant of warranty and no agree-
ment to the contrary:
(1) The article sold is merchantable and reasonably
suited to the use intended.
(2) The manufacturer knows of no latent defects un-
disclosed. 46
The constitutionality of this statute was challenged in Bookholt v. Gen-
eral Motors Corporation47 as violative of due process by interfering with
liberty of contract. The court dispensed with the defendant's contention
by stating that an "implied warranty is a legal and not a contractual
obligation ... .,"48 The court interpreted the statute by declaring:
... unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a manufacturer
of personal property offered for sale to the public as new prop-
erty must warrant that he has manufactured such property to
conform to the minimum standards therein set out.49
The later case of Diamond Alkali Co. v. Goodwin5 ° interpreted the
statute as allowing the manufacturer to expressly disclaim all warran-
ties. This interpretation could render the statute a dead letter. A further
narrowing took place in Revlon, Inc. v. Murdock51 wherein an employee
of the purchaser who was injured by the explosion of a bottle of nail
polish was held not to be an "ultimate consumer."
In 1962, Virginia enacted the following statute:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no de-
fense in any action brought against the manufacturer or seller
of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or
implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase
the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom
the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods .... 52
No case has yet construed the statute but it appears to be broader than
the Georgia statute in that a foreseeability test is used rather than the
words "ultimate consumer."
With the recent adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, it is doubt-
ful that Wisconsin will legislate specifically on the privity requirement.
As in most states, the problems of privity will probably continue to rest
on judicial interpretation.
46 GA. CODE ANN. §96-301 (1957). For a discussion of the cases interpreting this
Georgia statute see 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY, at 430-31(1961).
47 215 Ga. 391, 110 S.E. 2d 642 (1959).
48Id., 110 S.E. 2d at 644-45.
49 Id., 110 S.E. 2d at 645.50 100 Ga. App. 799, 112 S.E. 2d 365 (1959).
51120 S.11. 2d 912 (Ga. App. 1961).
52 VA. CODE ANN. §8654.3 (Supp. 1962), discussed in Emroch, Statutory Elinina-
tion of Privity Requirement in Products Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. REv. 982(1962).
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b. Legal Fiction Circumventing Privity
Constrained by the erroneous premise that warranty is distinctly
contractual in nature,53 the courts have been torn between satisfying
public policy and at the same time straining to adhere to strict con-
tractual rules of law. Although several theories have been advanced and
accepted in individual cases,5 4 the following have emerged as the "four
horsemen" in punching holes in the privity defense. To supply vertical
privity, the retailer has been designated the agent05 of the consumer;
to supply horizontal privity the buyer has been designated the agent of
the user. The late Professor Williston advocated the assignment theory6
whereby the purchaser passes his "warranty right" as a chose in action
to a sub-assignee who may then assert it against the original seller. The
third party beneficiary doctrine is credited with impressing the drafters
of the Uniform Commercial Code so as to be included in section 2-318.57
The fault lies in the fact that frequently neither the original buyer nor
seller knows who the "beneficiary" actually is or will be. This theory
has also seemingly kidhapped the tort concept of foreseeability, but as
evidenced by the "family, household, guest" limitation it refuses to ex-
tend the concept to its logical conclusion. Another widely accepted fiction
has been borrowed from property law: the warranty "runs with the
product." ' s But this theory is applicable only where there is vertical
privity because only a subvendee would have "title." The neighbor who
borrows a lawnmower and is injured by some defect in its construction
would have no remedy. Although in the battle of individual cases the
ingenuity of counsel and court must be commended, it appears that the
arsenal of legal fictions has been virtually exhausted. As Prosser points
out:
There is no need to borrow a concept from the concept law of
sales; and it is "only by some violent pounding and twisting" that
"warranty" can be made to serve the purpose [strict liability to
the consumer] at all.5 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the vistas of reform in the area of privity in products lia-
bility cases are so broad, it is difficult to even generally predict what
avenues of reasoning will appeal to the Wisconsin courts and/or legis-
lature. But it is probably safe to say that a looser privity requirement
53 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODucrs LIABILITY 376-82 (1961). PROSSER, TORTS
493 (2d ed. 1955).
54 Twenty-nine such fictions have been condensed by Gillam, Products Liability
in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1957).
55 Young v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 15 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D. Pa. 1936).
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is eventual and desirable both from the viewpoint of legal analysis and
public policy. The Wisconsin legislature has supplied the wedge by
adopting the Uniform Commercial Code. The pressure will have to be
applied by the courts.
PETER S. BALISTRERI
